Do Board Size and Independence Really Matter? An Empirical Study by Saeed, Sohail et al.
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.13, 2016 
 
20 
Do Board Size and Independence Really Matter? An Empirical 
Study 
 
Sohail Saeed* 
International Business School (IBS) 
Universiti Teknologi Malaysia,Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
 
Siti Zaleha Abdul Rasid 
International Business School (IBS) 
Universiti Teknologi Malaysia,Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
 
Rohaida Basiruddin 
International Business School (IBS) 
Universiti Teknologi Malaysia,Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
 
Abstract 
Board of directors is considered as the most basic part of effective decision making in the firms. However, the 
large or small board sizes are continuously in debate and no conclusive decision has yet been achieved. Likewise, 
research on board independence also shows contrasting results. Some studies are in favour of board 
independence, others focus their attention on the firm specific knowledge of executive directors. The purpose of 
this study is to examine the relationship of board size and firm independence with the firm performance in a 
sample of 609 firms of Karachi stock exchange over the period 2005-2012. This study uses the partial least 
squares method to determine structural links between the variables under study. The findings of the study 
demonstrate the fact that board size is positively related to the productivity, but negatively related to the 
profitability of the firms. However, board independence is positively related to the profitability and negatively 
related to the productivity of the firms. Overall, board of directors with two characteristics of size and 
independence has negative relationship with the firm performance.   
Keywords: board size, board independence, partial least squares, firm performance 
 
1. Introduction 
Board of directors and its impact on corporate performance is the most researched areas in the contemporary 
research. Board of directors is “elite and episodic decision-making groups that face complex tasks pertaining to 
strategic-issue processing” (Forbes and Milliken, 1999 p. 492). The board meets periodically to discuss 
important and crucial tasks and make relevant decisions through group participation, open discussion and 
coordination, which are the three processes for measuring board effectiveness in strategic decision-making 
(Zattoni et al., 2015; Minichilli et al., 2012). According to governance scholars, monitoring and advising are the 
two primary tasks of the board. Based upon the agency and stakeholders theories of corporate governance, the 
monitoring role of the board of directors makes it responsible to protect the shareholders and stakeholder interest 
in the business through controlling the activities of management (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). On the other 
hand, following resource dependence theory, the advising role of board underlines that the board provides 
important advice, counselling and support to the management to reinforce their competencies and experiences by 
giving feedback and hence, contribute to the strategic decision-making. The board can also help managers to 
solve critical matters or search new opportunities (Zattoni et al., 2015; Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). 
This paper focuses on the size and independence, two particular aspects, of board of directors. Some 
researchers, authors and academicians believe that small board increases the effectiveness of the board and is 
responsible for higher firm performance. Similarly, many believe that if more independent non-executive 
directors are on board, this enhances the board and firm performance. Based on these beliefs, the assumption of 
this study would be like that there is negative relationship between board size and firm performance and positive 
relationship between board independence and firm performance.  
The next section presents the literature review of the board of directors and firm performance. Section 
three reviews research methodology. In the fourth section, results and discussion are presented, followed by 
section five, the conclusion.  
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Board size and firm performance 
Board of directors is the most important internal governance mechanisms, developed internally and show 
effective reactions to organizational operating situations (Wintoki et al., 2012). Moreover, studies have shown a 
positive link between board structures and corporate performance, representing a likely substitution effect 
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between internal and external governance mechanisms. McCahery et al., (2010) documented that board structure 
becomes strong and important in those countries where legal and legislative institutions are weak and less 
developed to give proper protection of investors’ rights, and Pakistan is one of them. In addition, the board of 
directors is a group of shareholder-elected individuals whose primary responsibility is to act in the owners’ 
interests by looking after the business affairs and as stewards of an organization's resources. 
The large or small board sizes are continuously in debate and no conclusive decision has yet been 
achieved.  For example, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) are of the view that board size should not 
surpass eight or nine directors. Jensen (1993) stated that board became less effective and coordination is difficult 
if its size is beyond seven or eight directors.  He argued that cost of large board, i.e. less cohesiveness, slow 
decision-making, frank discussion, more control of the CEO, is much greater than the benefits gained by it. 
However, based upon the resource dependence theory, it is argued that large board size offers more directors on 
board in the form of independent non-executive directors and/or female directors with diversity in experience, 
knowledge and ideas (Guest, 2009). They can use their contacts to safeguard important resources from the 
external environment for the organizations (Ntim et al., 2014). Furthermore, when the firms get larger and more 
complex, there is a need for more advice and support to the management, which requires large board, ultimately 
(Coles et al., 2008). 
The empirical literature regarding board size and firm performance is mixed and conflicting.  By using 
data of 7999 firms from Australia for the years 2001-2011, Nguyen et al. (2015) found a significant negative link 
between large board size and firm value, measured by Tobin’s q. However, they mentioned this link to be 
stronger in smaller firms and they also maintained that firms with large board size have lower operating 
performance and higher cost. Nakano and Nguyen (2013) also found a negative impact of size and firm value in 
Japan and declared that large board firms tend to invest more rather than to remove non-performing assets. Wang 
et al. (2012) also showed the negative impact of board size on firm performance when they tested the 
relationship in bank holding firms in USA. Guest (2009) argued after analysing 2746 firms listed in years 1981-
2002 in UK that board size had a strong negative impact on firm profitability and shares return. Yermack (1996), 
also empirically, reported a negative relationship between board size and firm value; Tobin’s Q and return on 
assets, when he examined 452 large US firms in the period between 1984 and 1991.  
However, the results of different studies presenting the link between board sizes and firm performance 
as positive. Ntim et al. (2014) found a positive relationship between them when they examined 169 firms from 
South Africa for the period 2002-2011. They claimed the positive role of board size is a result of proper 
implementation of the resource dependence role of the board rather than the agency role of the board.  Shukeri et 
al. (2012) also found a positive link of size of boards with firm performance after having analysed 300 publicly 
listed firms in Malaysia. Adams and Mehran (2005) and Beiner et al. (2006) reported a positive relationship 
between board size and Tobin’s q, when they examined the firms in the USA and Switzerland respectively.   
In Pakistan, CG code requires firms to select board size from minimum five directors to maximum 
sixteen directors. There are very limited studies conducted in Pakistan, which focused on board size and firm 
performance. Haider et al (2015) and Yasser et al. (2011) found a significant positive link between board size 
and corporate performance in Islamic financial institutions in Punjab province and 30 firms for the years 2008-
2009, respectively. Ali and Nasir (2014) also found a positive relationship between board size and firm 
performance by arguing that this is the result of more directors with multiple skills and competencies.  
 
2.2 Board independence and firm performance 
In response to the big corporate scandals in 2001-2002 and after the SOX act in USA, 2002, the role of 
independent non-executive directors has increased and now almost all the code of corporate governance in 
different countries and stock exchange regulations require firms to maintain certain numbers of independent non-
executive directors on their board. According to agency theory, the board of directors is a system to protect and 
safeguard the interests of shareholders so it is necessary to have independent non-executive directors on the 
board to supervise executive directors and management to reduce agency cost (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
Resource dependence theory holds the viewpoint that independent non-executive directors enjoy good reputation 
among management as being competent, expert and professionals. They act as resources for the company with 
their diversifiable abilities, extensive knowledge and vast working experience to add value to firm rather than to 
act as just auditors (Mueller et al., 2008).    
There are studies, which show a positive relationship between independent non-executive directors on 
the board and corporate performance. Liu et al. (2015) found this link positive in government controlled firms in 
China and declared that board independence positively related to lower insider self-dealing. Wang (2014) studied 
the 21 empirical studies in China, found that only five studies show any relationship between board 
independence and firm performance, and in remaining 21 studies the link is insignificant. Black and Kim (2012) 
also found that board independence significantly improved firm performance in Korea. Another study done by 
Sanda et al. (2008) also found a positive relationship between board independence and return on assets and 
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return on equity on 205 Nigerian public listed firms from 1996 to 2004.   
However, Cicero et al. (2013) reported non-significant link between board independence and firm 
performance in the US firms. Shukeri et al. (2012) also showed a negative relationship between independent 
directors on the board and corporate performance after analysis of three hundred firms of Malaysia stock 
exchange. Singh and Gaur (2009) also found the board independence to be negatively linked to corporate 
performance. In Pakistan, Khan and Awan (2012) found a positive link between board independence and 
corporate performance of 91 firms from Karachi stock exchange while Malik (2012) concluded with no 
significant relationship between board independence and firm performance when he studied the link between CG 
measures and stock market prices of KSE-30 index firms for two years.  
 
2.3 Theoretical framework 
This study uses resource dependence theory to develop its theoretical foundations. It is argued that large board is 
in a better position to acquire critical resources from the environment and provide guidance to the management 
because it is better equipped with diversified, professional qualified directors (Gaur et al., 2015). Moreover, 
board advisory role is more concerned with higher firm performance rather than monitoring role (Brennan, 2006; 
Singh, 2011). In the same way, the independent non-executive directors are resources for the firm, contribute in 
terms of broad knowledge, experience and exposure, and provide the outside relations and networks that value 
the firms at the end (Gaur et al., 2015). 
 
3 Methodology and data analysis 
The sample for this study is the Karachi Stock Exchange 100 index (KSE -100) representing the largest 100 
firms, by market capitalization, listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). These firms are main firms of 
Pakistan and account for a wide range of business activities and economic output. The study examines a sample 
period of 8 years started from 2005 to 2012.   
The initial sample, of the KSE-100 Index, consists of 800 firm-year observations for the period 2005 to 
2012. However, the present study excludes 179 firms that operate in the financial sector, including commercial 
banks, Modaraba firms, investment banks and financial securities firms due to different asset base and different 
corporate governance requirements. Most of the variables discussed in study are taken from KSE, Securities 
Exchange Commission of Pakistan and the firms’ annual reports. The data which is not available in these reports 
are collected from respective firms’ websites and DataStream. 
 
3.1 Measurement of variables 
In this study, the board of directors variables are independent variables and corporate performance variables are 
dependent variables.. These variables are collected from the firm’s annual reports, websites of the respective 
firms. These are given as follows; 
Board size (B-SIZ): It is measured by the number of directors on the board. Board size is supposed to 
be an essential part of active decision-making. 
Independent non-executive directors on board (B-NED): It means the number of independent non-
executive directors on the board of directors. The independent non-executive directors are the source of vast 
knowledge, broad experience and diversified skills add value to the firm (Mueller et al., 2008). 
Return on total assets (ROA): It is calculated by dividing operating profit by total number of assets. 
This ratio measures the efficiency and utilization of total assets to generate profit.   
Return on equity (ROE): It is calculated by dividing pretax profit by the total book value of equity. It 
measures the ability of a firm to generate profits from its shareholders’ investments in the company.   
Total assets turnover (ATO): It is calculated by dividing total net sales by total book value of assets. It 
measures the contribution of total assets to generate sales in the company. This ratio also measures the 
productivity of the company. Table 3.1 below shows the summary of variables used in this study. 
 
3.2 Conceptual model and equations  
The proposed conceptual model of the study is made with the help of Partial Least Squares based Structural 
Equation Model  ing (PLS-SEM) as shown below. There are three mathematical equations to link these variables. 
Equation 1 1  B-SIZ B-SIZ B-NED B-NED+ 
Equation 2 ATO ROA ROAROE ROE  
Equation 3   1  1   
In these equations, 1 Latent exogenous variable, i.e. BOD (board of directors),  path co-
efficient, random disturbance term,   1= endogenous latent construct i.e. CP (corporate performance), 
= path co -effecient 
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3.3 Data Analysis 
This study uses PLS-SEM for data analysis. In PLS, minimum sample size and non-normal data are the major 
reasons for using PLS (Hair et al., 204; Henseler et al., 2009). The rule of thumb is that sample size should be 
equal to the 10 times the largest number of formative indicators (or structural paths) attached to single construct 
(Hair et al., 2014). This study sample size is far more than the minimum limit of PLS. Overall, the average size 
of the board of directors in KSE-100 index firms is 8.76 and independent non-executive directors on board 
constitutes 67.47% of the total board size in eight years as shown in the descriptive statistics in table 2. The 
average ROA is 14%, the average ROE of firms is 26% and the average of ATO is 1.22 which shows that net 
sales are 1.22 times of total assets in 8 years.   
3.3.1 Partial Least Squares Analysis 
PLS analysis comprises of two analyses; measurement model analysis and structural model analysis.  
Measurement model analysis involves assessment of reliability and validity of model by considering all 
indicators of constructs used in the model. Structural model analysis consists of significance of path coefficients, 
the level of R-square values R2 and the f effect size (Hair et al., 2014). This study uses the SmartPLS 3.2.0 
software (Ringle et al., 2015) for PLS analysis.  
Measurement model analysis 
The measurement model consists of two types, reflective measurement and formative measurement model. All 
he indicators used in this study for BOD and CP are formative in nature following the guidelines of Hair et al, 
(2014). The estimation of PLS assessments initiates with the measurement models and uses decisive criteria of 
indicator significance and multicollinearity that are exactly related to the formative outer mode (Ringle et al., 
2010). The bootstrapping approach with 5000 resamples in SmartPLS 3.2.0, is used in the data set to determine 
the significance of each indicator’s weight to its related construct to measure the validity in the measurement 
model. Andreev et al. (2009) suggested that the construct reliability of formative indicators should be tested 
through the test of multicollinearity (VIF). Table 3 shows the VIF values of all indicators of their respective 
constructs and does not find any sign of collinearity. All values are below than that of minimum threshold values 
(VIF< 5) as mentioned by Hair et al. (2014). Similarly, table 4 shows the indicators’ weight, t-values and p-
values reflect the significance of indicators in forming their respective constructs. It can be seen through the 
indicators of the BOD that B-SIZ and B-NED is significantly contributing to their construct at theα = 0.01 level. 
Likewise, ATO and ROA contribute significantly at α = 0.01 and, α = 0.05 levels, respectively, in making CP 
construct, however, ROE is not significant. Hair et al. (2014) recommended that in order to remove formative 
indicators if weight is not significant then outerloading should be tested before removing any indicator. The 
outerloading is also not significant for the ROE but as it is the indicator which is usually used as a performance 
measure in prior researches so it is kept for further analysis because the removal of formative indicator can alter 
the meaning of the construct (Hair et al. 2014). 
Structural model analysis 
In structural model analysis, the significance of path coefficients between BOD and corporate performance is 
tested as shown in figure 2. The value of R2 is also shown in the blue oval of endogenous variable i.e. CP. In 
PLS-SEM, Standardized path coefficients are used to measure the strength of relationship between latent 
variables (Hair et al., 2014). The significance of path coefficients (β) is determined through running Bias 
Corrected and accelerated bootstrap approach of 5000 resamples and the results are shown in the table 5 along 
with R2, adjusted R2 and f2 values. Figure 3 depicts the bootstrapping results which shows the t-values of 
indicators’ weights to their respective constructs and path between constructs.  
In table 5, path coefficient is significant at α = 0.01 levels, which shows a significant relationship 
between the board of directors and corporate performance. However, the significance is not positive, but rather 
negative that is supported by the studies of Bebchuk et al. (2004) who developed the entrenchment index (E-
index) of 24 items and found a significant negative relationship of CG and firm value. Moreover, Core et al. 
(2006) revisited the CG index of Gompers et al. (2003) and found a significant negative relationship between CG 
index and operating performance. Similarly, in studies of individual measures of board of directors and firm 
performance,  Nakano and Nguyen (2013), Wang et al. (2012) and Nguyen et al. (2015) found a significant 
negative relationship between board size and firm performance. Shukeri et al. (2012) and Singh and Gaur (2009) 
also showed a negative relationship between independent non- executive directors on the board and corporate 
performance. Values of R2 is 0.054or 5.4% and f2 is 0.057 which is a very small effect size and it cannot be 
determined that the board of directors may cause any variance in the firm performance. The adjusted R2 values 
are close to R2, which shows absence of insignificant indicator in the model (Hair et al., 2014).  
 
4 Findings and discussion 
In this study, PLS-SEM is used to conduct the data analysis and interpretation of results.  Two board measures 
and three corporate performance measures have been selected to find any relationship. Board size has a positive 
relationship to the productivity (ATO) of the firms. It means that as the more and more directors are added to the 
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board and board size increases, then the overall productivity of the firms increases (Ali and Nasir 2014; Coles et 
al., 2008; Ntim et al., 2014).  However, board size has a negative relationship to profitability (ROA) which 
shows that more directors fail to optimize the efficient use of resources to control costs and increase profitability. 
On the other side, the independent non-executive directors has negative link to the productivity, however, they 
have a positive relation to the profitability of the firms (Liu et al., 2015; Black and Kim 2012; Aggarwal et al., 
2009).   
The results of this study reflect two important insights related to the board of directors characteristics 
and corporate performance. Firstly, board size and independence moves in opposite directions when affecting 
corporate performance. For example, when size affects performance positively, then the independence effect is 
negative and vice versa. However, the overall impact of BOD on corporate performance is negative as shown in 
table 5 and figure 2. Secondly, corporate performance is measured through productivity and profitability, which 
have different  relationships to the BOD. Board size and productivity shows a positive relationship which may be 
interpreted as more and more directors contribute their skills, education, expertise and firm specific knowledge 
to increase productivity, however, their contribution to reduce costs and control budget was not successful and 
large board size affects the profitability of firms negatively. Similarly, the presence of more independent non-
executive directors affects negatively to the productivity, which may be interpreted as independent directors may 
not have more firm specific knowledge because the productivity is related to the operational performance of 
firms and executive directors are more familiar with the operational environment of the firms. However, 
independent directors contribute positively to the profitability of firms which show that their knowledge and 
expertise is more linked with the audit, cost and budget control related matters.  
 
5 Conclusion and suggestions 
This is the pioneer study that looks into the impact of ‘whole construct’ of BOD on ‘whole construct’ of CP and 
separate measures of BOD and individual measures of CP, in the same study by using PLS-SEM approach for 
secondary data. This study is advance in the literature as it develops the structural model for the interpretation of 
BOD and CP constructs and their indicators. Moreover, it is concluded that, overall, the resource dependence 
theory is inappropriate in its direct relationship to corporate performance, which proves that role of resource 
dependence theory is not to protect value rather its primary role is to create value in the firms. Although, in this 
dilemmatic situation, independent directors contribute their knowledge and expertise to the profitability of the 
firms, however, the board size contributes negatively to the profitability. It may also mean that small board size 
with more independent non-executive directors can contribute positively to the profitability of firms. In addition, 
the large board size with less number of independent directors contribute positively to the productivity of firms. 
Hence, it is a tradeoff between productivity and profitability and the choice rests with the firms. 
This study is limited to the KSE 100 companies and is also country specific. Future researchers may 
expand this research to add more firms and countries as well as more indicators to draw a broader picture of 
BOD and corporate performance.  
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Table 1. The variables under study 
Variables Codified as   Description 
Board size B-SIZ Number of total directors on board 
Independent non-executive 
directors  
B-NED 
Number of independent non-executive directors on board 
Return on total assets ROA Calculated by dividing operating profit by book value of total assets 
Return on equity 
ROE 
Calculated by dividing pre-tax profit to common stockholders’ 
equity 
Total asset turnover  ATO Calculated by dividing net sales by total book value of assets 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive Statistics 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.Deviation 
B_SIZ 609 5 16 8.76 2.046 
B_NED 609 0 15 5.91 2.98 
ROA 609 -0.4693 1.7478 0.142 0.159 
ROE 609 -2.5243 1.8887 0.256 0.394 
ATO 609 -0.0509 6.1848 1.225 1.055 
 
Table 3:  Reliability test 
Latent Variables Indicators VIF 
Corporate Governance B-NED 1.74 
B-SIZ 1.74 
Corporate Performance ROA 1.71 
ROE 1.68 
ATO 1.14 
 
Table 4: validity test 
Latent Variables Indicators outer weights t-values p-values 
Corporate Governance B-NED 1.321 17.52*** 0.000 
B-SIZ -0.864 4.275*** 0.000 
Corporate Performance ROA -0.571 2.415** 0.017 
ROE -0.015 0.926 0.928 
ATO 1.028 13.63*** 0.000 
** Significance at 5% (1.96). *** Significance at 1% (2.576) 
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Table 5: Significance of path coefficient 
Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance 
Path coefficient  t-value p-value R2 Ad. R2 f2 
-0.232 5.163*** 0.000 0.054 0.052 0.057 
 
Figure1. The relationship between the board of directors and corporate performance  
BOD= board of directors, B-SIZ= board size, B-NED= independent non-executive directors,  
CP= corporate performance, ROE= return on equity, ROA= return on assets, ATO= asset turnover ratio. 
 
 
Figure2: structural model of board of directors and corporate performance 
 
 
Figure 3: Bootstrapping result showing significance  
